Following the rationale of the KMV model, this study builds an empirical model to price corporate credit risk for listed corporations in Hong Kong. To mitigate the bias from accounting data, the model totally relies on market-based information, such as equity value, stock market index, implied volatility of market index, riskfree rate and maturity. This fits in the reality of emerging credit markets that there is no credit mortality data, limited external credit ratings and limited data on bond yields. We find some weak evidence to support the model. Both the equity value and the stock market index have significantly negative effects on credit spreads, while the implied volatility of the market index, which measures the economic risk, shows significantly positive effect. The model explains more than 20% of the raw yield spreads. When extreme cases are removed, its explanatory power jumps to more than 50%. Observed and predicted credit spreads are slightly cointegrated. It is obvious that the model is not a complete solution but it successfully helps estimate the credit spreads and corporate credit risk of all listed corporations in Hong Kong. This solution can also be applicable to other emerging credit markets.
I. Introduction
Corporate Credit Risk Analysis outside the US The new Basle Accord requires banks to establish internal risk ratings system to assess their credit risk and capital charges. Wholesale banks would have little problem to comply with this requirement since their credit-related assets are mostly tradable bonds or syndicated loans with external credit ratings. Even though they have non-marketable loans, these loans are usually granted to corporations with external credit ratings.
Observed bond yields and external credit ratings can indicate reliably their credit risk and help estimate the total risk of a credit portfolio including these debts.
For banks specialized in corporate lending for medium-sized and small-sized corporations, the establishment of an internal ratings system will be a challenge. It is because these loans are not tradable and their issuers tend to have no external credit ratings. This challenge will be particularly severe for debts associated with non-US corporations. Currently, the US is the largest and the most efficient corporate bond market in the world. Many US corporations have their bonds traded in the market. Even less creditworthy corporations can issue high-yield bonds. As long as their debts are actively traded in the market, information about company risk, industry risk and economic risk can be efficiently reflected in their yields. This facilitates assessment and benchmarking the credit risk of individual US corporate borrowers. Relative to the US, the corporate bond markets in Europe and in Japan are smaller but still have a substantial number of corporate bonds with external credit rating. However, the number of highyield bonds for medium-sized corporations in these markets is very limited. For other capital markets, especially those emerging markets, corporations mainly rely on bank loans for debt financing. Just look at those newly developed economies in Asia, such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong. Very few corporations in these economies are able to issue bonds because of no external credit ratings. This phenomenon implies that banks have relatively little information to assess their credit risk of non-US corporate borrowers and thus build their internal ratings system for credits outside the US. Under this circumstance, loan pricing tends to be inefficient. What banks usually do is either to set unreasonably high interest charges for unsecured corporate debts, to concentrate their lending on a small number of "safe" companies, or to pledge their corporate debts with real estates. These practices hinder the growth of small businesses, discourage the firms without a strong base of real estates, and interrupt the equilibrium of the real estate market.
It is obvious that non-US corporate borrowers are disadvantaged in debt financing.
Meanwhile, banks granting loans to non-US borrowers are also disadvantaged in evaluating credit risk and building their internal ratings system.
Dynamic Corporate Credit Analysis
Without observed bond yields and external credit ratings, how can banks evaluate corporate credit risk? This is what banks have done for the last century. Traditionally banks relied on accounting information to judge the profitability, financial risk and business risk of corporate clients. Furthermore, statistical analysis on actual default cases, judgments on management quality, and judgments on the characters of key executives were frequently included. The scandals of Enron and Worldcom indicate that accounting information is no longer reliable for corporate credit risk analysis. Corporations are inclined to window-dress their financial statements because of different reasons.
Traditional statistical analysis, such as Altman's (1968) discriminant analysis, is mostly static and based on historical default cases. It tends to be unable to predict default probabilities in the future and tends to provide conclusions lagging behind changes in economic conditions. For instance, Asian corporations had a sharp change in their credit risk after 1997. Statistical models on credit spreads and default probability developed before 1997 had little help after the Asian financial crisis. The remaining inputs of corporate credit analysis are subjective judgments. These judgments vary between loan officers and depend much on their professional quality and their resources on information.
In the past ten years, corporate credit analysis underwent tremendous changes. Credit analysts began to adopt dynamic models to price corporate debts. One of the most popular models is Merton's (1974) option approach to corporate debt. It argues that a firm tends to default when its asset value goes below its liabilities. Required interest rate on corporate debts can be calculated under the assumption of no arbitrage opportunity. In the early 1990s, KMV, a consulting firm in the US, modified the model and provided real-time information on credit risk and default probability with continuous estimates on asset value, liability size and asset volatility. Today many banks subscribe KMV services.
In 2002, Moody's Ratings acquired KMV to supplement her credit rating business. The merit of dynamic credit models is that yield spreads and default probabilities are predictable on real-time basis with the help of on-going changes in selected time-series variables. These models will be particularly helpful when economic conditions change drastically and when accounting information is not updated frequently.
Scope of this Study
It is well understood that the US is the largest bond market and has voluminous information about bond yields, credit ratings and default cases. Previous empirical research on corporate debts is mainly concentrated on US data. Whether these findings are applicable to markets outside the US, especially those emerging debt markets, remains a question. One realistic issue for these studies is that database for the credit market outside the US is very limited and it cannot fit into the models built by the studies. is available for modeling and statistical testing. However, it will take years to build the database. Before the emergence of any better empirical credit risk models on Hong Kong debts, our model has significant economic value because banks can rely on it to evaluate corporate credit risk and build their internal ratings system. Another contribution of the study is that application of the model to other debts markets is feasible as long as the markets provide the time series required.
The rest of paper will proceed as follows. Section II discusses how the model is developed. Section III describes the data. Section IV discusses the empirical findings.
Section V concludes the paper. 1 Elton et. Al. (2001) find that credit ratings explain only a very small part of US credit spreads. this will mean a negative impact of the riskfree rate on the borrowing interest rate. In general, it is believed that it will be a 1 > -1 because higher riskfree rate should be associated with higher interest charge.
II. Development of the Model
Equation [5] is obviously an incomplete model. However, it merits our attention in the following ways. First, it involves no direct measures on financial leverage and asset volatility. As mentioned above, these two measures may be biased by accounting information. Second, all the variables are easily accessible and relevant time-serious data is on continuous-time basis. This means, we can renew corporate credit analysis, credit spreads and implicit default probabilities on continuous basis.
In reality, credit spreads are affected by many other factors 2 , such as corporate governance, management quality, financial ratios, external credit ratings and so on. This means, Equation [5] tends to oversimplify the pricing mechanism of corporate credit
spreads. Yet it must be noted that all these factors are not continuous variables. 2 For instance, changes in financial ratios are available twice a year for Hong Kong firms.
Reports on changes in credit ratings are offered to the public occasionally. In many cases, these reports lag behind price movements in the capital market. On the other hand, management quality and corporate governance are subjective measures. Even though there are recognized reports on these factors in the market, credit spreads tend to change well before the public release of the reports. Because these reports simply summarize facts rather than generating new facts. Therefore, if we need a model to determine corporate credit risk on continuous basis, Equation [5] appears to satisfy the need.
III. Data
This study applies Equation [5] were excluded from the analysis. As a result, only 18 bonds and around 700 monthly yield spreads were included in the data analysis. Table 1 displays the bond issuers, the number of observations, the period involved and the equity value of the issuers. All these bond issuers tend to have larger firm size and better reputation than those having no bonds traded in the market. As shown in Table 1 , several bonds have long time length, say over 60 months, while most of them have a time length between 12 months and 48 months.
Insert Table 1 
The Variables
Equation [5] involves only six variables -yield-riskfree-rate ratio {ln(Sp t +R f,t )/R f,t }, the riskfree rate {ln(E t )}, the equity value of a bond issuer {ln(E t )}, the market index {ln( M t )}, implied volatility of index options {ln(σ m,t )} and maturity {ln(T t )}. The credit spread {Sp t } is provided by Datastream, which is simply the bond yield minus the oneyear T-Bond yield. Some previous studies define credit spread is the difference between yield on coupon-paying bonds and yield on T-bond of the same maturity. Elton and et.
Al. (2001) recently measured credit spread as the difference between yield on a zerocoupon corporate bond and yield of zero-coupon government bond. Because of limited data available, this paper does not make any adjustments on the Sp t on the basis of maturity, coupon rate, liquidity and other special bond features.
The equity value is the market value of an issuer's equities. The market index is Hang Seng Index -a popular market index in Hong Kong. Implied volatility is an average implied volatility of Hang Seng Index options having strike prices around index closes.
Bloomberg provides this data of implied volatility. Maturity is the number of months before maturity. Insert Table 3 around here   Table 3 displays the parameter estimates of Equation [5] for the three samples. There are two models in Table 3 . Model 1 is exactly Equation [5] , while Model 2 is Equation [5] without the variable ln (T t In brief, we find significant parameters for the variables ln(E t ), ln( M t ) and ln(σ m,t ). The former two have negative relationship with credit spreads and the last one positively affect credit spreads. It appears Equation [5] is a good model since it accounts for more than 20% of the variations of the dependent variable in the whole sample. Some may suggest the inclusion of rolling historical volatility of individual stocks as an independent variable in Equation [5] . However, we found no significant improvement in explanatory power when the rolling historical volatility was included in the Equation [5] . One possible explanation is that the equity value and the implied volatility of the market index have sufficiently reflected the market risk and credit risk of the issuer.
Residual Analysis
To further examine the validity of Equation [5] in predicting credit spreads, we examined the residuals obtained from Samples 1, 2 and 3. A good model will mean random distribution of the residuals and no additional variables can explain their distribution.
The additional variables considered are all category variables and they are all observable in the debt market. They might have nonlinear effects on the yield spreads. These variables include:
• NMV: All equity values were ranked and grouped into "Small", "Medium" and "Large". This tests whether some nonlinearity exists between equity value and yield spreads.
• NCOUPON: All coupon rates were ranked and grouped into "Low", "Medium"
and "High". This tests whether yield spreads are sensitive to coupon rates.
•
YEAR: This category variable include the seven calendar years (i.e. 1996-2002)
To test their effects, we applied a 3-factor linear model to test their main and interaction effects on the residuals.
Insert Table 4 around here Table 4 summarizes the main and interaction effects of the three variables. Almost all the factors, except the main effect of NCOUP, have significant impacts on the residuals. The adjusted R-Squares are over 69%. seems that Equation [5] still has its contributions before the emergence of any more complicated models that can deal with time-varying parameters and changes in the risk profile of bond issuers.
Equation [5] is the linear form of Equation [4] . Some may argue that the relationship may be in nonlinear form. To investigate this possibility, we applied neural network approach to predict credit spreads with the variables in equation [4] . Several neural network models provided very high R-square (close to 90%) in Sample 1. However, when unit root tests were applied to the residuals, we obtained no evidence of stationary residuals.
This means, from the perspective of cointegration, there is no long run relationship between the credit spreads and the predictions from the neural network models.
Although Equation [5] is simple, it remains as a convincing model to predict corporate credit spreads with limited information.
Out-of-Sample Forecasts
To check the predictability of Equation [5] , we obtained some out-of-the sample forecasts.
We 
V. Conclusions
Following the rationale of the KMV model, this study has attempted to build an empirical model to price corporate credit risk for around 700 listed corporations in Hong Kong. To mitigate the bias from accounting data, the model totally relies on market-based information, such as equity value, stock market index, implied volatility of market index, riskfree rate and maturity. This fits in the reality of emerging credit markets that there is no credit mortality data, limited external credit ratings and limited data on bond yields.
We find some weak evidence to support the model. Both the equity value and the stock market index have significantly negative effects on credit spreads, while the implied volatility of the market index, which measures the economic risk, shows significantly positive effect. The model explains more than 20% of the raw yield spreads. When extreme cases are removed, its explanatory power jumps to more than 50%. Observed and predicted credit spreads are slightly cointegrated. In addition, the study finds that both coupon rate and equity value have some subtle nonlinear effects on credit spreads.
This may be due to peculiar features of individual bonds and credit risk of individual issuers. It is obvious that the model is not a complete solution but it successfully helps estimate the credit spreads and corporate credit risk of all listed corporations in Hong
Kong. This solution can also be applicable to other emerging credit markets. 
